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In Review
An Elegant but Incomplete
Analysis of Delegation

bill is passed under restrictive procedures.
* Congress will delegate more discretion in areas where policymaking
requires intensive information.

Reviewed by David Schoenbrod
DELEGATING POWERS: A Transaction
Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making
Under Separate Powers
by David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran
250 pp. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999

between making policy or deleOR CONGRESS, THE CHOICE
gating policymaking power to
an agency is like a private business's choice between making a
component or buying it from a vendor.
That analogy is the departure point of
David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran's
new and important book. The analogy
proves splendidly fruitful, generating
empirically supported insights not only
into the factors that cause Congress to
make policy or "buy" it from agencies
but also into the forces that shape how
Congress organizes conmittees iand
oversees agencies.
DECIDE OR DELEGATE;
MAKE OR BUY
BORROWING THE APPARATUS THAT

economists use to explain firms' makeor-buy decisions, political scientists
Epstein and O'Halloran construct a simple but elegant model of Congress's
decide-or-delegate decisions. The protagonist in their model is the median
legislator who faces pitfalls in either
choice. If Congress decides, the policy
outcome may be suboptimal because
the legislative committee (a) sneaks in
David Schoenbrod is a professor at the New
York Law School and an adjunct scholar at the
Cato Institute.

statutory provisions that deviate from
the median legislator's desires or (b)
produces a stinker of a result by inaccurately forecasting the effects of its
statutory provisions. If Congress delegates to an agency, the agency may be
able to produce better results for the
median legislator because of its access
to expertise or ability to make postenactment course corrections. But the
agency can also produce worse results,
from the median legislator's perspective,
if it has different objectives.
SUCCESS IN DESCRIPTION
USING THE MAKE-OR-BUY MODEL, THE

authors make these predictions:
* When government is divided, Congress is less likely to delegate and delegations are more likely to be to agencies insulated from direct presidential
control.
* Legislators from the president's
party are more likely to support delegation.
* The preferences of committees will
move opposite to changes in the preferences of the executive and will move
closer to the preferences of Congress
as a whole.
* Congress is more likely to delegate
when the preferences of the committee deviate from the preferences of
Congress as a whole.
* The more cohesive the majority
party in Congress the less authority
will be delegated.
* Congress will delegate less discretion when the legislation is referred to
more than one committee or when the
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These interesting predictions-and
there are more-would seem difficult to
test, but the authors found ways to do
the job. Their database consists of 257
major bills considered by Congress
from 1947 to 1992, from which they
tease out proxies for their variables. To
make a long story short, all of their predictions are borne out in full by more
statistical methods than I ever forgot.
Epstein and O'Halloran's elegantly
developed theoretical model and comprehensive empirical results are just the
beginning. Other analysts will use their
model and data to investigate questions
related to Congress's delegation decisions. For example, at a forum on delegating powers at the 1999 convention of
the American Political Science Association, two of my fellow panelists, Professors Daniel Carpenter and John
Ferejohn, suggested that the book's
methods could be used to shed light on
the factorsthat influence congressional decisions about allocating power to
the federal, state, or local level of government or to agencies or courts. Other
political scientists will suggest improvements in Epstein and O'Halloran's
methodology.
The point is that at the very beginning at their academic careers (theyare
associate professors at Columbia University) they have created a new technique that marries two previously disparate political science disciplines-the
study of Congress's internal organization and the study of Congress-executive
branch relationships.
PROBLEMS IN PRESCRIPTION
BRILLIANT AS THE BOOK IS, IT IS LESS

than brilliant when the authors turn
from description, their main task, to
prescription. They say there is no reason to worry about the rising power of
the administrative state, basing their
opinion on their findings that recent
Congresses have granted no more discretion to agencies than did the Congresses of the 1940s and 1950s. But, as
Carpenter and Ferejohn pointed out, if
Congress has steadily granted new discretionary power to the administrative
state, the sum of that power may well
have increased mightily. Moreover,
agencies increase their power not just
through action by Congress but also
by steady "mission creep"
and occasional bursts of
"mission leap"-as when
Ther
the Food and Drug
Administration claimed
control of tobacco.

as a motivation for delegation, but
they decide to leave it out of their
descriptive model for two reasons.
The first reason is this: "The theory
[that Congress delegates to shift
blame] implies that constituent benefits will be delivered via delegation,
while broad, general policy benefits
will be passed in the legislature. This
assumption runs counter to the usual
notion that legislators are engaged
almost entirely in providing constituency benefits through pork barreling and casework" (p. 32).
In concluding that the blameshifting
theory of delegation does not fit experi-

because any alleged problems either
have been fixed or are imaginary. If only
it were so.
There are real reasons why real
problems go unsolved, and among those
unsolved, nonimaginary problems is
delegation. A legislator who argues that
a bill should not be passed because it
delegates will have to come down on
one side or the other of the politically difficult choice that delegation is being used
to evade and so will pay the political
price that the rest of Congress wants to
avoid. The willingness to object to delegation in the context of specific bills is
not a survival trait among legislators.
Nonetheless, complaints from constituents

e are real reasons why real prob Iems
go unsolved, and among those unso Ived,
no iimaginary problems isdelegati on.

A Key Omitted Variable The
key prescriptive error in
the book is this: "In our
view, delegation is a self-regulating system not in need of closer attention
from the judiciary" (p. 238). That opinion is unsupported by the book's
descriptive model because it is built
upon the assumption that Congress
delegates only to get the policy results
sought by legislators and not to let legislators strike politically attractive
poses. But, as Professor David Mayhew
concludes, "In a large class of legislative
undertakings the electoral payment is
for positions rather than for effects" (p.
132 of Congress: The Electoral Connection
[New Haven: Yale University Press,
1986]). Delegation allows legislators
the opportunity to claim credit for the
benefits of a statute, but to shift the
blame for part of the costs to an agency.
If, as Mayhew concludes, legislators
delegate to fool constituents rather
than to produce the policy effects they
want, then the authors have no normative basis for concluding that the decision whether to delegate can happily be
left to the cross talk between Congress
and the executive branch.
Blameshifting Epstein and O'Halloran
understand that blameshifting is identified in the political science literature

ence, the authors misunderstand the theory. Scholars in the field (notably Professor Morris Fiorina) argue that whether
legislators find it politically beneficial to
delegate depends not only on the size
of the group that benefits but also on
the degree to which delegation causes
legislators to lose credit for benefits and
the degree to which delegation shifts
blame for costs to the agency. (See Fiorina's "Group Concentration and Delegation of Legislative Authority" in Regulatory Policy and Social Science, edited by
Roger G. Noll [Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1985]). Mybook on delegation, PowerWithout Responsibility:How
Congress Abuses the PeopleThrough Delegation (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1993), which Epstein and O'Halloran
cite, uses Fiorina's theory to predict the
results that Epstein and O'Halloran claim
it cannot explain.
Epstein and O'Halloran's second
reason to neglect blameshifting is not
just wrong, but bizarre. They write: "For
[the blameshifting] logic to work, voters must constantly be fooled by delegation, lacking any political entrepreneur to inform them of its deleterious
nature" (pp. 32-33). By such reasoning,
there are no problems in our polity
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about delegation have registered among the political entrepreneurs on Capitol Hill. Claiming to

respond to complaints

about agency discretion,
legislators enacted the
Congressional Review Act,
which lets legislators decide whether to
vote on repealing new agency regulations. As such, it gives legislators the
option of taking responsibility. Guess
what? They do not want it and have
hardly ever used the act to take it.
Another piece of legislation, the
Congressional Responsibility Act, sponsored by Rep. J.D. Hayworth, some seventy other members of the House, Sen.
Sam Brownback, and a dozen other senators, would make responsibility a mandate rather than an option. It would provide that a new agency regulation could
not go into effect unless enacted by Congress. The bill, which I helped to draft, is
based on a proposal floated in a law
review article by Justice Stephen Breyer,
in which he suggested expedited
procedures to speed routine regulations
through the legislative pipeline.
Although sponsorship of such
prodemocracy legislation is politically
advantageous to individual members,
earning them much praise from constituents, the passage of such legislation
would be politically disadvantageous to
congressional leadership because it
would force hard choices. The leadership in Congress is blocking serious consideration of the bill.

Popular complaints about delegation are reflected also in bills dealing
with specific topics. After Congress
delegated broad authority over air pollution in 1967, Ralph Nader blasted
Sen. Edmund Muskie for putting
progress on pollution into a political
limbo. Muskie responded with the
1970 Clean Air Act, which, he said,
"faced the hard choices with candor."
But Congress faced only one hard
choice about one source of pollutionnew cars-and as to them left itself an
escape hatch. As to the rest, the act
delegated again, but hid the legislators'
failure to take responsibility about the
substantive choices that really matter-how clean to make
the air and upon whom
to impose the cleanup
Th
burden-by imposing a
truckload of procedural
instructions on the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). In other
words, Congress found a
way to micromanage the
agency and yet to shift blame to it by
delegating the hard choices.

power to regulate and tax, it did not
require Congress to undertake all
aspects of regulation and taxation.
Rather, as the Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution in its first century, Congress must establish the rules
of conduct as to regulation and taxation, or at least make the significant
choices needed to put such rules into
place. For Congress to do more, to go
beyond making the generally applicable rules into micromanagement,
would make government less functional and less accountable. As Justice
Lewis Powell stated in Chadha v. INS,
"Congress is most accountable politically when it prescribes rules of general

most pollutants, there is no sharp
dividing line between health and danger but only a continuum of more or
less risk. As the father of the original
Clean Air Act, Sen. Edmund Muskie,
later acknowledged, "Our public health
scientists and doctors have told us that
there is no threshold, that any air pollution is harmful. The Clean Air Act
is based on the assumption, although
we knew at the time it was inaccurate,
that there is a threshold." By this intentional inaccuracy-that is to say, lieCongress ducked taking responsibility
for striking the balance.
There is also no standard for how to
allocate the burden for cleaning up the
environment. EPA can pick
and choose among subcat-

e Revolutionary War was fought to
cons train the coercive power of the state;
thus 'No taxation without representa tion."

Delegation vs. Micromanagement Many
lawyers and political scientists get
confused about the difference
between delegation and micromanagement. Epstein and O'Halloran are
among the confused. When they
speak of delegation, they mean micromanagement. That does not make
their descriptive work any less useful.
But what they so brilliantly describe is
micromanagement, not delegation in
the constitutional sense. That description should have no persuasive power
in deciding what the courts should do
about delegation.
Delegation is a concept of constitutional law and so must be understood
from the perspective of the Constitution's purposes. The most important and
relevant purposes are to make government functional and accountable to voters. The Revolutionary War was fought
to constrain the coercive power of the
state through accountability. Thus "No
taxation without representation."
But, when the Constitution assigns
to Congress-and to no one else-the

applicability."
Some examples will illustrate the
difference between delegation and
micromanagement. Congress wrote a
subsection of the 1990 Clean Air Act to
require EPA to respond to each toxic
chemical by issuing regulations for
each industry that require all plants to
bring emission rates down to the level
achieved by those plants in the twelfth
percentile of cleanliness. Thus, in relatively few words, Congress could state
the rule without getting into the details
of every pollutant or every industry
that emits that pollutant. Nonetheless,
Congress made itself responsible for
striking the balance between the competing claims of environmentalists and
industry. Disappointed environmentalists and industrialists know precisely whom to blame for the resulting
regulations.
Consider, in contrast, what happens under most of the rest of the
Clean Air Act and, indeed, under most
environmental legislation. Congress
ordains that the agency protect health
and keep an eye on the costs of pollution control. There is no standard for
how clean to make the air because, for
REGULATION
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egories of firms, deciding

to go easy on some and
harder on others. (Plenty of
room for shenanigans
here.) And, whatever regulations finally get imposed,
legislators
can deny
responsibility because the
choices were up to the agency.
To make the significant choices,
Congress need not state its general rules
numerically. Congress did enough, for
example, when it prohibited employers
from discriminating on the basis of
gender except where there is a bona
fide occupational qualification. That
standard leaves many questions to be
resolved industry by industry, but
nonetheless provides a benchmark by
which to resolve them.
Because of their misunderstanding
of the constitutional concept of delegation, Epstein and O'Halloran obliquely convey the mistaken impression that
in stopping delegation the country must
give up the efficiency that can come
with the proper use of agencies; for
example:
* They see efficiency in fast-track
trade legislation, but mistakenly classify it as a delegation. It is not. The fast
track is a way to speed trade deals
through the legislative process of Article I of the Constitution. Therefore, the
fast track is not a delegation of legislative power.
* They see efficiency in the base-clos-

ing commission, but mistakenly classify it as a delegation of legislative
power. It is not. Although the making
of rules for the regulation and taxation
of private persons is a legislative function assigned exclusively to Congress
under Article I of the Constitution, the
management of federal property is left
to the more open-ended Article IV, and
under Article II the executive has considerable discretion in the management of the armed forces.
* They see efficiency in leaving the
regulation of airline safety to the
experts at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), but Congress could
make use of that expertise and still
take direct responsibility for airline
safety. One way would to require FAA
to require the use of "best practices,"
emulating the subsection of the Clean
Air Act that sets emissions standards

at the twelfth percentile of cleanliness
in each industry. Another way would
be to require Congress to enact proposed regulations. Or the agency
could be allowed to choose between
best practices and congressional
enactment.
We should not be indifferent to
Congress's choice among the many
constitutional ways to delegate. Real
consequences flow from agenda-setting devices, such as fast-track trade legislation and the base-closing commission, and from micromanagement. That
is why Epstein and O'Halloran's
description is so valuable, even though
it does not describe delegation in the
constitutional sense.
Power vs. Responsibility Finally, Epstein
and O'Halloran get the critics of delega-

The Costs and Benefits
of User Fees-Oh, Never
Mind the Costs
by Filip Palda

117 pp. Vancouver:
The Fraser Institute, 1998

marized briefly: User fees are
HIS SHORT BOOK CAN BE SUMgood, taxes are bad. Country
clubs are good, suburbs are bad.
Dense is good, spread out is
bad. And everyone who lives in the suburbs works downtown.
The thesis is that by imposing user
fees on municipal services, citizens
will see the true cost of their demands
on the city and will therefore adjust
William T. Bogart is an associate professor of
economics at Case Western Reserve University
and the author of The Economics of Cities and
Suburbs (Prentice Hall, 1998).

CONCLUSION
MY CRITICISMS FOCUS ON ONLY A FEW

pages of a long and splendid book.
When Epstein and O'Halloran apply
their considerable talents to incorporate blameshifting into their model and
gear it to delegation in a constitutional
sense-as I hope they do-we will all be
in a better position to understand the
true effects of Congress's abdication of
I
its constitutional responsibility.

imposing user fees places "pearls before
swine." Palda even goes so far as to criticize the computer game SimCity
because it does not give the player the
option of collecting user fees!
THE AUTHOR'S SELECTIVITY
THE BOOK MAKES ME GRATEFUL FOR

Reviewed by William T. Bogart
HOME ON THE URBAN RANGE:
An Idea Map for Reforming the City

tion wrong when they have us saying
that delegation is bad because Congress
abdicates power (p. 237). Congress
does not abdicate power, or at least not
much. It has a hundred ways to keep
some grip on agencies. What Congress
abdicates is not power but responsibility. That is why the question of delegation should be a question for the courts
as well as the politicians.

their consumption appropriately. As
a result, settlement patterns will
become more dense, highway congestion will be reduced, solid waste will no
longer clog landfills, and democracy
will become more vibrant as citizens
hold elected officials accountable and
elected officials respond quickly to citizens' demands.
The prose is entertaining and
breezy, albeit with an edge of indignation about the current system of property taxes. Palda likens the local property tax to a "ring of invisibility" for
politicians because it protects them
from direct accountability for the quality of local public services. The wealth
("honey") resulting from the high productivity of cities attracts "beekeepers"
that care for and increase the wealth
but also "bears" that plunder it. And
providing general services without
REGULATION
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peer-reviewed academic journals.
Although the cost of peer review is that
it often limits advances in knowledge to
tiny increments, the benefit is that
authors must confront awkward facts
and countervailing theoretical arguments. The author of this book is
extremely selective about both the theory and the facts that he chooses to present. The net effect is to deceive the
reader about the true benefits and costs
of his proposed reforms.
Itoo am a fan ofuser fees, but ignoring arguments against user fees does not
make those arguments go away. It is well
known, for example, that Seattle
imposed large user fees on garbage collection in the 1980s. In his discussion of
the effects of those fees (pp. 74-75), Palda
never mentions the "Seattle stomp,"
which reduced the volume of garbage
collected by increasing its density. People
will react to user fees by changing their
behavior, sometimes in ways unwanted

